Feds Charge Atlanta Man Who Gave Border Agents 'Self-Destruct' Password For Phone

A federal judge in Atlanta is weighing whether to throw out the evidence in what appears to be the first US prosecution of a traveler over a phone's built-in "duress password" - a privacy feature that erases a device when the wrong code is entered.

Samuel Tunick, an Atlanta resident and US citizen, was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a), which makes it a crime to destroy or damage property to prevent the government from seizing it. The offense carries up to five years. He has pleaded not guilty and is seeking to suppress the government's evidence, arguing the search and seizure that produced it were unlawful. A ruling is not expected before the end of October.

Tunick was returning from vacation on January 24, 2025, when Customs and Border Protection pulled him into secondary inspection at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. According to his motion to suppress, agents demanded access to his phone on the stated suspicion that it contained child exploitation imagery, without offering evidence to support that suspicion. They told him they did not need a warrant because he had not yet crossed into the country - the government's long-standing position that arriving travelers are not on US soil until admitted.

His lawyers say he asked for an attorney repeatedly and was refused, and that he was never advised of his rights.

Tunick provided a passcode. An officer entered it. The screen went dark, flashed repeatedly, and the device restarted with its contents gone. Agents seized the phone anyway and told him he was free to enter the country.

The indictment, returned in the Northern District of Georgia, alleges he knowingly destroyed, damaged, wasted, disposed of or otherwise acted to delete the phone's digital contents in order to impair the government's lawful authority to take the property into its custody. The document contains the typo "Untied States Code."

At a hearing last Monday, a Justice Department attorney and the agents who ran the stop characterized the encounter as an ordinary airport inspection. They were looking for "anything that's prohibited," CBP officer Larry Findley testified.

What Preceded The Stop

Three hours before Tunick's plane landed, a Homeland Security agent circulated an email carrying his name and photograph and stating that he was under investigation for suspected terrorism activities. It went to agents on CBP's tactical terrorism response team and to an officer with the FBI's Atlanta joint terrorism task force, according to The Guardian, which first reported the case.

Tunick's attorneys argue the child-exploitation rationale was a pretext, and that the real interest was his association with Defend the Atlanta Forest, the movement that spent years opposing the police training campus known as Cop City. The state's own sprawling racketeering case against 61 people tied to that movement was dismissed last year by a Fulton County judge, with the Georgia attorney general appealing.

CBP's tactical terrorism response teams were created in 2015 and have operated with almost no public visibility. The ACLU sued the agency in 2019 seeking records on the units, describing them as highly secretive teams that target, detain and interrogate travelers.

GrapheneOS

Tunick's attorneys have confirmed his Google Pixel was running GrapheneOS, a hardened Android replacement stripped of Google's tracking components. Among its options is a duress PIN - a second code, indistinguishable from the real one, that triggers an irreversible wipe. No warning, no confirmation prompt, nothing to give it away. Whoever types it cannot know what it is doing until it is finished.

GrapheneOS documents the feature as intended for people who may be forced to unlock a device, naming journalists, activists and travelers facing border searches - and warns in the same documentation that a triggered wipe could be treated in some jurisdictions as destruction of evidence. 

Matthew Dodge, an assistant federal public defender on Tunick's team, called the use of the statute in this context incredibly rare. Runa Sandvik, who runs the security consultancy Granitt, said she had never seen a case built on a duress password, though she has spent years walking journalists and activists through the scenario. Christophe Boutry, a French cybersecurity and surveillance specialist, said the prosecution mirrors what is already unfolding in France and Spain, where authorities have run into GrapheneOS on the phones of journalists, lawyers and political opponents. His argument is one of ownership: the device belongs to the user, and the state does not get to dictate how it is configured.

Unfriendly Venue?

The Eleventh Circuit may be the government's biggest advantage in the case. In United States v. Touset (2018) it held that border agents need no suspicion of any kind to search a device, forensic or manual, reasoning that if none is required to open a suitcase, none should be required for a phone. In the Fourth or Ninth Circuits the pretext argument would carry real weight - both require reasonable suspicion for forensic searches, and the Ninth confines border phone searches to digital contraband rather than general evidence of domestic crime. In Atlanta, the defense has to attack the scope of the search rather than the absence of grounds for it.

The statute, meanwhile, is also narrower than it looks. Section 2232(a) requires impairing the government's lawful authority to seize such property. Lawfulness is an element of the offense, not merely a suppression question, so an unlawful seizure could put the conduct outside the statute altogether. 

A Fourth Amendment win may not end the case regardless. The alleged offense occurred in the agents' presence, in response to the demand the defense says was unlawful, and courts generally hold that a new crime committed in reaction to an illegal search is not suppressible.

The Fifth Amendment may be the more promising route, because the act constituting the offense is speaking a passcode. If that was compelled in custody without warnings or counsel, the utterance itself may be suppressible. There is a wrinkle in Tunick's favor: the same circuit that is least protective on border searches is among the more protective on compelled decryption, having held in 2012 that forced decryption can be testimonial. Prosecutors will argue that secondary inspection is not custody and that "unlock it or we keep it" is not legal compulsion.

Then there is intent. Officers typed the code, not Tunick, so the government must prove purpose rather than infer it from a physical act - and the defense has pointedly declined to concede he meant to wipe anything. The evidence that a duress code was configured at all lived on the device that now holds no data.

We'll be keeping an eye on this one...